Plans That Survive Real Tuesdays

Statutes

• A.R.S. § 25-403 — Legal Decision-Making; Best Interests of the Child

  The court shall decide legal decision-making and parenting time, whether originally or on a petition for modification, according to the child's best interests, considering all factors relevant to the child's physical and emotional well-being. The listed factors include: the past, present and potential future parent-child relationship; the child's relationships with parents, siblings and others; the child's adjustment to home, school and community; the child's wishes if of suitable age and maturity; the mental and physical health of everyone involved; which parent is more likely to allow frequent, meaningful and continuing contact with the other parent (not applied against a parent acting in good faith to protect the child from domestic violence or child abuse); whether a parent intentionally misled the court to cause delay, raise litigation costs or gain a preference; domestic violence or child abuse under § 25-403.03; coercion or duress in obtaining an agreement; whether a parent has complied with chapter 3, article 5 of Title 25; and whether either parent was convicted of falsely reporting child abuse or neglect. In a contested case the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons the decision is in the child's best interests. The section does not rank the factors and does not set the threshold for reopening an order; timing and affidavit requirements for modification are in § 25-411. Although § 25-403 does not rank its factors, a domestic-violence finding under § 25-403.03 (as rewritten by HB 2995, operative June 22, 2026) creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption that awarding that parent legal decision-making or parenting time is contrary to the child's best interests, and § 25-403.04 creates a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint legal decision-making for a parent found to have abused drugs or alcohol, or convicted of a listed drug or DUI offense, within twelve months before the petition.

• A.R.S. § 25-403.01 — Sole and Joint Legal Decision-Making and Parenting Time

  The court may order sole or joint legal decision-making. In deciding the level of decision-making that is in the child's best interests, the court shall consider the § 25-403(A) factors and all of the following: whether the parents agree to joint legal decision-making; whether a parent's lack of agreement is unreasonable or influenced by an issue unrelated to the child's best interests; the parents' past, present and future abilities to cooperate in decision-making to the extent a joint order requires; and whether joint legal decision-making is logistically possible. A parent with sole legal decision-making may not unilaterally change a court-ordered parenting-time plan. A parent who is not granted sole or joint legal decision-making is entitled to reasonable parenting time ensuring substantial, frequent, meaningful and continuing contact unless the court finds, after a hearing, that parenting time would endanger the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health. This section creates no presumption for or against joint decision-making or equal parenting time, but other sections do: under § 25-403.03 as rewritten by HB 2995 (Laws 2026, ch. 263, operative June 22, 2026), if the court finds a parent committed domestic violence, that parent may not be granted sole or joint legal decision-making or unsupervised parenting time unless the parent overcomes a mandatory presumption by clear and convincing evidence, or supervised parenting time unless the parent overcomes it by a preponderance of the evidence, and the other parent does not have to prove the violence was severe or frequent enough to justify restrictions; and under § 25-403.04 there is a rebuttable presumption against sole or joint legal decision-making for a parent the court finds abused drugs or alcohol, or was convicted of a listed drug or DUI offense, within twelve months before the petition or request was filed.

• A.R.S. § 25-411 — Modification of Legal Decision-Making or Parenting Time

  A motion to modify a legal decision-making or parenting-time decree may not be filed earlier than one year after the decree unless the court allows it on affidavits showing reason to believe the child's present environment may seriously endanger the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health; a joint legal decision-making order may be challenged at any time on evidence that, since it was entered, domestic violence involving a violation of § 13-1201 or § 13-1204, spousal abuse, or child abuse occurred, and after six months for the other parent's failure to comply with it. To modify legal decision-making the moving party must file an affidavit or verified petition with detailed facts and give the other parties a copy, and the court shall deny the motion unless the pleadings establish adequate cause for a hearing; neither requirement applies to a request that only modifies or clarifies parenting time without changing legal decision-making. The court may modify parenting time whenever it would serve the child's best interests but shall not restrict a parent's parenting time unless it finds the parenting time would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health, and if a parent is charged with a dangerous crime against children, child molestation, or domestic violence in which the victim is a minor, the other parent may seek an expedited hearing and the court may suspend parenting time or change legal decision-making ex parte until then. Under HB 2995 (Laws 2026, ch. 263, operative June 22, 2026), a parent who committed domestic violence and previously failed to rebut the § 25-403.03(D) presumption remains subject to it in any modification, regardless of the allegations in the new pleadings, and whether it can now be overcome is decided first, when the court decides whether a sufficient change of circumstances has occurred; for such a parent, § 25-403.03(G) separately bars unsupervised parenting time unless the presumption is overcome by clear and convincing evidence. The section does not define the general change-of-circumstances standard (it mentions a 'real, substantial and unanticipated change in circumstances' only in the military-deployment context), and the court shall assess fees and costs against a party whose modification action is vexatious and constitutes harassment.